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Abstract. Th is paper aims at investigating the Freudian symptom as an individual 
anti-language involved in a semiotic antagonism towards the internal logonomic 
system. In Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, the symptom is interpreted according 
to transcendental and atemporal principles. Leaving aside these principles, we argue 
for a social semiotic approach in which the meaning of symptom is determined by 
its antagonistic relationship to the logonomic system, and also by its converted link 
with the repressed object in a specifi c socio-cultural context. Th e symptomatic an-
tagonism is marked by a hypocritical and ambivalent relationship with the logonom-
ic system and the repressed entity. Th e duplicitous semiosis of the symptom refers 
to rhetorical transformations made to reach a compromise between the contradic-
tory poles of the law and the forbidden phenomenon. As regards the relation of the 
symptom to subjectivity, the symptom emerges as a conjuncture in which the subject 
of statement is related to the subject of speaking in a confl icting way. Accordingly, 
the former as the replica of a legisign-subjectivity is related symptomatically to the 
latter as a mere sinsign not preceded by any ideological subjectivity. Th e symptom is 
like a hinge on which the opposing doors, namely consciousness and unconscious-
ness, turn. Finally, the case of Little Hans will be analysed proceeding from the an-
tagonistic aspects of symptom.
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1. Introduction
Th e symptom is considered to be a compulsive, automatic, and non-arbitrary sign 
with a natural link between its signifi er and signifi ed (Sebeok 1999: 46). Taking 
into account the natural and causal motivations behind symptomatic signifi cation, 
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Peirce (1953) considers the symptom as a subcategory of indexical signs. It should 
be noted, however, that the symptom as a semiotic object cannot be reduced to the 
category of indexical signs marked by linear cause-and-eff ect chains (see Uexküll 
1986: 205–6). Far from being a mere physiological object, the symptom may emer-
ge as a phenomenon conditioned by socio-cultural discourses; as a result a fi xed 
and atemporal signifi cation, or a direct corporeal causality between its signifi er 
and signifi ed may not be assumed (see Staiano-Ross 2012). Freud was the fi rst to 
go beyond physiological causality as regards symptom interpretation, and conside-
red the symptom as a symbolic and rhetorical message (Quintavalle 2002: 46). Th e 
Freudian symptom, that is, the symptom analysed in the psychoanalytic discourse, is 
an umbrella term which covers diff erent phenomena such as slips of the tongue, in-
voluntary behaviours, dreams, etc. Th ey are not explained in terms of mere physio-
logical causality, but read in terms of the intersubjective and symbolic history of the 
patient. Hysterical blindness exemplifi es the Freudian symptom. Although it seems 
to be a corporeal disorder, it is rooted in the non-physiological and intersubjective 
experiences of the person (Freud, Breuer 1996; Freud 2010: 22–25). Freud (e.g. 1914, 
2002, 2010) explored various kinds of symptoms. Th ey emerge from the repression 
related to cultural and ethical considerations. Th e symptom as a sign is a substitute 
for a repressed object (Freud 1926: 91). Being a substitute, the meaning of the symp-
tom is always somewhere else, that is to say, it cannot be interpreted by itself, but 
should be related to another sign to acquire its meaning. Th e second sign is the rep-
ressed object related to the symptom metaphorically or metonymically. Using some 
rhetorical and fi gurative transformations including displacement and condensation, 
the symptom replaces the repressed object which cannot be expressed according to 
ethical rules (see Freud 2010). Th e rhetorical transformations give rise to the mys-
terious message of the symptom. By disguising illegal desires, it lets them be exp-
ressed indirectly. By applying structural linguistics, Lacan (2006a) tries to defi ne the 
symptom and its rhetorical transformations in terms of syntagmatic and paradigma-
tic relations. Consequently, the rhetorical metamorphoses of the symptom have been 
explained as metaphor and metonymy. 
But the question is why the symptom occurs, and why the symptom represents 
its repressed object in a converted way? Freud (2001) and Lacan (2006b) explain 
the symptomatic events in the light of some atemporal and transcendental prin-
ciples including the Oedipus complex, castration anxiety, and desire for incest. 
Regarding Freudian psychoanalysis, it seems that these principles are transhistori-
cal and transcendental. Freud believed that they are true for every society and every 
time. Symptoms can be interpreted by being relegated to the Oedipal principles. If 
we take these unvarying principles as a universal and eternal syntax, it can be argued 
that violating one of the rules results in an ungrammatical and problematic sentence, 
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namely the symptom. Considering Freudian psychoanalysis, human beings have a 
core syntax which produces normal and grammatical structures, that is to say nor-
mal personalities. Accordingly, symptomatic behaviours are seen as a kind of apha-
sia. Neurosis and psychosis are two kinds of psychological aphasia that have violated 
the rules of Freudian syntax.
Whenever a patient refers to a psychoanalyst, s/he asks the analyst to interpret 
her/his symptoms according to the atemporal and universal syntax of psychoanalytic 
ideology. As Uexküll (1986: 215) puts it, the only thing (in the symptom) that is ac-
cessible to the observer (physician or analyst) is the physical sign carriers, namely 
the signifi ers without the signifi eds. Also Barthes (1972) argues that the symptom 
achieves its meaning when it is read in the light of a certain medical discourse. Th is 
is because the symptom emerges as a pure signifi er. So it can be argued that the 
Freudian syntax provides the signifi ed (interpretation) for the symptom as a pure 
signifi er. Th e agency of discourses in symptom interpretation refers to the semiotic 
nature of the symptom. Emerging as pure signifi ers, symptoms seek their meaning 
by addressing the big Other (Žižek 2008: 79). Regarding the heterogeneity of society 
(or the big Other), diff erent discourses may supply diff erent meanings for a certain 
symptom. Freudian transcendental syntax as one of the diff erent possible discourses 
pretends to be universal and atemporal, but it has faced many criticisms regarding 
its claims about universality and neutrality. For example, Hodge and Kress (1988) 
criticize Freud’s atemporal and transhistorical approach in analysing Oedipus the 
King. Proceeding from social semiotics, they read this text in terms of socio-histor-
ical antagonism. Also Deleuze and Guattari (2000) condemn the familial basis and 
lack of historicity of Freudian psychoanalysis. Th ey highlight the political and social 
struggle behind the Oedipal myth. Likewise, Jacques Derrida (1981) believes that 
Freudian psychoanalysis suff ers from phallogocentrism as the heritage of old tra-
dition of metaphysics and patriarchy. Also, the feminist movement casts doubt on 
the universalism of psychoanalysis because of the great impact of patriarchy on it, 
and because of ignoring the female agency in the genesis of psyche (e.g. de Beauvoir 
1956; Irigaray 1983a, 1983b; Kristeva 1984). Furthermore, it should be noted that 
medical anthropology rejects the notion of the universal symptom, and presents 
the idea of local biologies (e.g. Lock, Kaufert 2001; Lock, Nguyen 2010; Lock 2013). 
Considering the criticisms, it can be argued that they have mostly been directed at 
the atemporal and universal aspects of Freudian Psychoanalysis. Th e transcenden-
tal Freudian syntax is not justifi ed in interpreting the symptoms. Th is fundamental 
syntax is the metaphysical moment of the psychoanalytic treatment. Regarding the 
present era in which meta-narratives (see Lyotard 1984) have been challenged to a 
considerable extent, the universal principles and the atemporal syntax for symptom 
interpretation are inconceivable. 
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Friedrich Nietzsche was the fi rst to recognize the relevance of any static syn-
tax to the theological-metaphysical tradition. His famous sentence “I am afraid we 
cannot get rid of God because we still believe in grammar” (Nietzsche 2005[1889]: 
170) demonstrates this point clearly. It means that any static and universal princi-
ples bring about a metaphysics that promotes a contingent discourse into the posi-
tion of a universal and eternal one. Aft er Nietzsche, many scholars have denied the 
static and universal grammar. For example, Hopper (1998) rejects the myth of rule-
based grammar. He presents an emergent grammar which is dependent on a specifi c 
socio-temporal discourse. In the same manner, the concept of the rule is replaced 
by that of tendency (toward a prototypical construction) in cognitive grammar (see 
Langacker 2008, 2009). Accordingly, grammar is made by subjective construal de-
pending on a contingent socio-physical context. Denying any sort of rule-based 
grammar, Tabakowska (1993) believes that linguistics and stylistics are the same, in 
other words, they are bound to fi nd alternatives and diff erences without any under-
lying rules. Th e end of meta-narrations and the absence of a universal syntax seem 
to be related to the absence of any universal syntax for the psyche. 
 Taking into account the absence of an atemporal and principled syntax, how can 
the symptom as a sign be interpreted? Without Freudian-Lacanian atemporal prin-
ciples such as the Oedipus complex, and the name of father, it seems that the faint 
line between the symptom as a converted sign and other kinds of signs fades away. 
If there is no Freudian universal syntax, how can we speak about the psychoanalyt-
ic symptom? Th is paper tries to answer these questions. It aims at investigating and 
explaining the Freudian symptom (the psychoanalytic symptoms and not the pure 
physiological symptoms in biomedical discourse) as a sign within a symbolic an-
tagonism conditioned by socio-ideological context. Firstly, I discuss the relevance of 
ideology to signs, and then consider the social determinations of symptom. 
2. Symptom as an individual anti-language 
Although Saussure (1915) distinguishes parole from langue, and defi nes langue as 
the main object of linguistic inquiry, he acknowledges the social basis of language, 
and considers language as a social fact. However, Voloshinov (1973) denies the arti-
fi cial distinction between langue and parole, and considers linguistics and semiotics 
to be a branch of the study of society and ideology. He considers sign as something 
loaded with ideological meanings. Accordingly, langue as an abstract system can-
not be separated from its social foundations. Also, he casts doubt on the homoge-
neity and unitary character of language and semiotic systems, and regards them as 
something full of variations and antagonism. In the same manner, Halliday (1978) 
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emphasizes the social basis of language, and categorizes linguistics as a subfi eld of 
social semiotics. Consequently, these theoretical backgrounds give rise to social 
semiotics (e.g. Hodge, Kress 1988; Van Leeuwen 2005). From the point of view of 
social semiotics, signs are not isolated and abstract entities, but are dependent on 
their socio-ideological contexts. Th ey are determined by some regulative principles 
(logonomic system) derived from socio-ideological positions. Th e logonomic sys-
tem as a set of ideological principles determines the production and interpretation 
of signs. It can be argued that each sign is derived from a logonomic perspective, 
and is laden with ideological meanings. In case of a confl ict among diff erent ide-
ologies, linguistic and semiotic struggles come into existence (see Fairclough 1989; 
Hodge, Kress 1988). Accordingly, the semiotic sphere and the homogeneous langue 
are decomposed into many antagonistic ideological accents. It should be noted that 
the dominant discourse tries to suppress other discourses and create a fake homo-
geneity. Every contradiction or opposition to the dominant logonomic system faces 
resistance or violent reaction from the dominant discourse. It should be mentioned, 
however, that the other oppressed discourses try to challenge the dominant semi-
otic order by anti-languages. Th e subordinates create anti-language to challenge 
the dominant semiotic style (see Halliday 1978; Hodge, Kress 1988: 87). Th en, each 
discourse challenging the dominant logonomic order can be considered as an anti-
language. Accordingly, the anti-language embodies the semiotic struggle within the 
semiotic communities. 
Taking into account the undeniable social basis of signs, the symptom cannot be 
isolated from socio-ideological foundations. It should also be considered within the 
heterogeneous and antagonistic semiotic community. For this purpose, let us review 
the Freudian defi nition of the symptom in detail. Th e symptom as a sign is a substi-
tute for the repressed desires and phenomena which are unethical and illegal. Th is 
repression is done by ego at the behest of superego (Freud 1926: 91). Th e ego and su-
perego represent the rational-ethical ideology of the society. It can be argued that the 
ego and superego are the internalized logonomic system. Consequently, they try to 
regulate the circulation of thoughts, desires, etc. As a result, psychological repression 
is done by the internalized logonomic system. For escaping from the repression and 
censorship imposed by the internal logonomic system, the symptom paves the way 
to satisfying the illegal desires in a converted and indirect manner. Th is transformed 
satisfaction, however, is achieved via rhetorical transformations (displacement and 
condensation). Th en, the substituted sign, namely the symptom, is related in a fi gu-
rative way to the repressed object to challenge the dominant logonomic order. As far 
as the challenging of the internal logonomic system by the symptom is considered, 
we can call the symptom a specifi c anti-language made by an individual in order to 
resist the dominant logonomic system. Also, because it belongs to a person and not a 
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social group, we can call it an individual anti-language. It can be argued that this in-
dividual discourse may fade away aft er a while, or take the form of a social discourse 
by reproducing itself in the social sphere. 
Symptomatic semiosis cannot be reduced to a mere opposition to the logonomic 
order, because it adapts its superfi cial properties to the logonomic norms. Th ere is 
always a complicated dialogue between the symptom and the dominant logonom-
ic system. On the one hand, the symptom challenges the logonomic order which is 
manifested as a continuous interpellation of the superego; on the other hand, it car-
ries out the challenging indirectly via some rhetorical transformations to adapt itself 
to the logonomic system. Th e identity of the symptom cannot be separated from its 
betrayed addressee, namely, the internal logonomic system. To sum up, the symp-
tom as a rhetorical transformation relates two contradictory phenomena with each 
other. It links the repressed entity to the conventional semiotic order by rhetorical 
strategies. 
Th e relationship between the symptom and the logonomic system is full of an-
tagonism and heterogeneity. It means that the symptom, while adapting itself to the 
semiotic order of the logonomic system, tries to escape its limitations, and challenge 
the monophony of the dominant discourse. To explain this point, let us consider 
the symptom of forgetting the intentions. Freud (1914: 159) refers to a soldier who 
dares not defy the military rules. Th e soldier cannot tell his commander: “I hate to 
obey your disgusting orders” for he will be severely punished. But by forgetting them 
unconsciously, he can justify his disrespect for military orders. Using this symptom, 
he can escape the punishment by the logonomic order of the military system, and 
also satisfy his desire to disobey the orders. Accordingly, forgetting as symptomatic 
behaviour tries to satisfy the repressed desires and escape from being punished by 
the logonomic system. In this case, the symptom is in an antagonistic relationship 
with the dominant discourse. Considering the antagonistic relation of the symptom 
to ideological discourses, the main role of the symptom is providing a way of getting 
rid of the limitations imposed by the logonomic system. But this antagonism and 
challenges are made possible via some rhetorical transformations in order to adapt 
symptoms to the semiotic norms of the logonomic system. As concerns the case of 
the forgetful solider, it can be argued that ignoring the orders challenges the mili-
tary system, but this challenging is made possible only by selecting forgetting instead 
of disobeying. Disobeying is replaced by forgetting in order to make the disrespect 
more compatible with the logonomic system of the military institution. In other 
words, forgetting the orders is not considered as breaking the law. Th en, there is a 
triadic relationship between the symptom, the logonomic system, and the repressed 
desire. Th e symptom does not express its repressed object directly, but denotes it in a 
fi gurative and ironic way. Consequently, the symptom has a contradictory nature: on 
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the one hand, it is related to an illegal phenomenon, namely the repressed entity; on 
the other hand, it adjusts the repressed entity’s appearance to the semiotic norms of 
the logonomic system by some rhetorical transformations.
Th en, the symptom has hypocritical relations with the logonomic system and the 
repressed desires. Th e concurrent relations to the contradictory poles bring about 
discordant rhetorical constructing of the symptom. In order to clarify the contra-
dictory message of the symptom, let us consider the fetish as a symptom. Th e fe-
tish as a sign is a metaphoric or a metonymic substitute for a hideous object (Sebeok 
1999: 123). It replaces the hideous object with a less dangerous thing. Th e substitute 
is related to the repressed object metaphorically or metonymically. For example, the 
fetish of a high-heeled shoe as a metonymy for a feminine body, or the fetish of a 
long object as a metaphor for the phallus have replaced the dangerous objects with 
other objects. Th e fetish wants to be related to the repressed object in an indirect 
way, and also tries to adapt itself to the logonomic order by using a harmless object. 
Accordingly, fetish like other symptomatic phenomena has a contradictory relation-
ship to ethical-legal restrictions and repressed wishes. Th ese discordant relations 
make the most prominent aspect of symptomatic discourse, and also distinguish it 
from other simple anti-languages. Th e mysterious message of symptom refers back 
to this ambivalent attitude to the repressed object and the logonomic regulations. 
Th erefore, it is not necessary to relegate the symptom to the transcendental Freudian 
principles for interpreting it. By considering the dialectic relationship of the symp-
tom to the logonomic system and the suppressed phenomena, we can interpret 
symptoms. Th is dialectical relation is determined by a symbolic antagonism within a 
socio-ideological situation.
To sum up, the symptom as a rhetorical transformation relates two contradictory 
phenomena with each other. It links the repressed entity to the conventional semiot-
ic order by rhetorical strategies. As a result, the symptom as a specifi c anti-language 
challenges the established semiotic order by expressing the repressed entity, but it 
also preserves its relation to the logonomic system via rhetorical transformations. 
Th ese concurrent relations are constrained by socio-cultural conditions. To investi-
gate the symptom as a socio-cultural entity instead of it being preceded by transcen-
dental principles, it is necessary to defi ne culture as an immanent entity. In other 
words, culture should be regarded as a historical and changeable phenomenon, and 
not as ruled by transhistorical and transcendental principles. In the next section, I 
shall try to present an immanent analysis of culture and explain its relevance to the 
symptom.
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3. Totem, taboo, and the symptom
In Totem and Taboo Freud (2001[1913]) presents a pseudo-mythical narrative in 
which some boys kill their father, and lie with their mothers. Aft er these traumatic 
events, they regret committing these acts. Aft er that, a memorial sign for the father 
is built by the boys, and a law passed which strictly forbids incest. Th e memorial 
sign and the law are embodied by the totem and the taboo respectively. Th e totem 
is the distinctive symbol for the tribe, and the taboo exemplifi es the tribe’s rules and 
regulations. Th is myth is used to illustrate the agency of some transcendental prin-
ciples including the Oedipus complex, the desire for incest, and the unique role of 
the father in shaping the human personality. Th is imaginary story is taken by Freud 
as a universal and transhistorical foundation of human civilization and culture. Th e 
main principles of Freudian syntax are extracted from it. It is evident that this story 
is full of patriarchal themes: the active role of fathers and boys, and the passive role 
of mothers and girls. What is important in this story is not the Freudian clichés such 
as the Oedipal events and the traumatic roots of culture, the most important point 
is the agency of a privileged sign, namely the totem, in producing culture and law. If 
we disregard Oedipal clichés and the remorse from which the boys suff er, the most 
important moment in this story is the semiotic genesis of culture by the totem as a 
specifi c sign. Th e totem as a super-signifi er gives rise to a necessary foundation for a 
certain semiotic order. Accordingly, culture can be considered as an output of semio-
sis without there being any preceding Oedipal principles. Th e totem as the super-sig-
nifi er and the taboo as the legal restrictions and regulations represent the logonomic 
system for socio-cultural systems. Accordingly, to explain the genesis of a culture, it 
is not necessary to presuppose any atemporal principles. Th e genesis of culture can 
be explained by semiotic activity which brings about a certain logonomic system in 
a socio-cultural context. It means that the sign itself is the main factor which should 
be regarded as the immanent reason for the genesis of culture. Accordingly, culture 
as an immanent semiotic entity relies upon semiotic activity and not on transcen-
dental and eternal rules. It is not necessary to presuppose a transcendental condition 
behind the sign of the totem, as it may have diff erent contents in diff erent socio-his-
torical conditions. Th us, every culture can have diff erent totems and taboos, that is 
to say diff erent logonomic systems. It should be mentioned that each semiotic order 
is bound to its socio-cultural context; so there are no universal and eternal logonom-
ic systems nor universal totems and taboos. 
Considering the immanence of culture, the question arises concerning the rela-
tionship between the symptom and the logonomic system as embodied by the totem 
and the taboo. It can be argued that each symptom can be interpreted and produced 
according to its underlying symbolic discourse. In other words, the totemic structure 
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is like a reference point according to which the symptom is interpreted. But the 
symptom has a mysterious relation to its reference point. As mentioned above, the 
symptom as a substitute tries to satisfy the repressed desire, but it accomplishes this 
work by rhetorical transformations to escape the censorship imposed by the domi-
nant logonomic system. Th e concurrent contradictory relations of symptom to the 
totemic structure (the logonomic system) and the repressed object make its interpre-
tation possible. Th is means that when the symptom and its dialectical relationship 
to culture as a semiotic entity are considered together, the meaning of the symptom 
becomes clearer. Th is dialectical relation is conditioned by the socio-cultural situa-
tion in a specifi c era. 
However, still another question can be posed: why do symptoms occur for indi-
viduals in a culture? Regarding the question, the relevance of the social subjects to 
the symptom should be illustrated. As is the case with social subjects, discourses also 
try to reproduce their desired ideological subjects. Th ey produce the subjectivity that 
is compatible with their logonomic systems. Th ey accomplish this aim by the proce-
dure of interpellation. Interpellation is a process by which ideology transforms in-
dividuals into subjects, namely, a subjective position determined by ideological and 
discursive meanings and functions. By interpellating the subjects, ideology off ers 
them an ideological position and identity (see Althusser 1971). As a result, the sub-
jects are produced according to the order of the logonomic system. Failed interpella-
tion results in the emergence of subjects that are surplus to the dominant logonomic 
system. In other words, when the dominant ideology cannot produce its desired 
subjects, and also does not regulate them successfully, subjects emerge that challenge 
the logonomic order. Consequently, the surplus subjectivity challenges the conven-
tional semiotic order of the dominant discourse. As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, the symptom is a kind of anti-language; accordingly, it can be argued that the 
symptom occurs in those subjects who are not overwhelmed by the interpellation 
of the dominant logonomic system. For example, a neurotic subject obsessed by il-
legal and unethical motivations is not completely overcome by the dominant ethi-
cal discourse. Consequently, s/he produces symptoms in order to preserve her/his 
relationship to the suppressed entity, but s/he does such a work in a fi gurative way 
to adapt her/his rhetoric to the symbolic norms. Th erefore, the symptomatic subject 
has a complicated relation to the law and the suppressed entity. In the next section, I 
shall investigate subjectifi cation and its relation to the symptom in more detail.
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4. Subject and symptom
Benveniste (1973a: 224) considers subjectifi cation as a by-product of communicative 
discourse: “It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject, 
because language alone establishes the concept of ego in reality.” Indexical pronouns 
like ‘you’ and ‘I’ generate subjectivity. By applying the pronouns the participants be-
come subjects of a specifi c discourse (Benveniste 1973b: 220). In addition, because 
of the dependence of the indices on each other, subjectivity is a relational and de-
pendent entity:
Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use I 
only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address. It is this 
condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that reciprocally 
I becomes you in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as I. 
(Benveniste 1973a: 224–5)
Accordingly, subjectivity is fi rstly a linguistic product, and then it is a relational en-
tity, because I and you cannot be imagined without each other. Th e most important 
point in Benveniste’s approach is that subjectivity is explained immanently accord-
ing to its underlying discourse. No transcendental and atemporal principle is used 
to explain subjectifi cation. Th e second important point is that subjectivity is not an 
autonomous and independent entity, but a relational and diff erential phenomenon. 
In this regard, the concept of split subjectivity is presented. It refers to the splitness 
and confl ict between the subject of statement which is represented and reproduced 
by the discourse, and the subject of speaking who is the agent of speaking without 
being represented verbally in the discourse (Benveniste 1973a). Th is dual subjectiv-
ity produces what is called the splitness of subjectivity which is highlighted by the 
psychoanalytic school.
Lacan (2006c: 650) considers the subject of statement as actualized in the pro-
noun I as the ego or consciousness. But the subject of speaking is regarded as the 
subject of the unconscious. It emerges through our speech, but cannot be equated 
with I or the subject of statement. Th e subject of statement belongs to the realm of 
meaning, ego, and consciousness, and that of speaking belongs to the sphere of be-
ing and unconsciousness (Fink 1995: 42–6). Accordingly, the ego and the superego 
as the representatives of the logonomic system belong to the category of the subject 
of statement as represented and reproduced by the discourse, while the repressed, 
unconscious and unrepresented subjectivity which is excluded from the discourse 
belongs to the category of subject of speaking. 
As mentioned above, each discourse or ideology tries to reproduce its desired 
subjectivity by the procedure of interpellation, and the symptomatic subjectivity 
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is the result of failed interpellation. Th erefore, it can be argued that the subject of 
statement as reproduced subjectivity is produced by the logonomic system in a spe-
cifi c context, and the subject of speaking as the excluded unconscious subjectiv-
ity is the repressed subject who expresses herself/himself through some converted 
signs, namely symptoms. By producing a special symptomatic anti-language the 
suppressed subject escapes the censorship imposed by the dominant discourse, 
and expresses itself in a disguised way to be compatible with the logonomic system. 
Th e main attribute of the subject of statement is being reproduced according to the 
ideological cliché of subjectivity, but the subject of speaking emerges as something 
unique and unanticipated that is not conventional and normal. It seems that the 
symptom as a linkage between the law and the repressed relates these two kinds of 
subjectivities. In order to explain these points let us consider two terms by Peirce.
Peirce (1998: 142–3) distinguishes between three kinds of signs, namely the qual-
isign, the sinsign and the legisign. Th e distinction between the second and the third 
signs is important here. Th e sinsign is an actual thing or event, while the legisign is 
a general type which has been agreed upon by the participants in a communicative 
society. Th e legisign can be actualized in diff erent contexts. It can be compared to 
a phoneme which has many allophones in diff erent phonetic contexts. Each of the 
manifestations of a conventional legisign is called the replica. Peirce believes that 
each replica is itself a sinsign, that is to say an actual and concrete sign. Each replica 
is preceded by a conventional legisign: 
Th e replica of a legisign is sinsign. Th us, every legisign requires sinsigns. But these 
are not ordinary sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as 
signifi cant. Nor would the replica be signifi cant if it were not for the law which 
renders it so. (Peirce 1998: 143)
Th us, the legisign reproduces itself through many replicas in diff erent contexts. It 
should be noted, however, that there are sinsigns which are not replicas. It means 
that they are not preceded by a legisign agreed upon by participants in the semiotic 
community. For example an event or a thing not belonging to the semiotic order can 
present itself as a sign and attract our attention. Th e replica is the reproduced form 
of a conventional legisign, but pure sinsigns are unique and unconventional. For ex-
ample, a common noun like ‘orange’ is a legisign which can be reproduced by many 
replicas in diff erent contexts, but a ‘spontaneous cry’ in a desert is a sinsign. Th e lat-
ter is not articulated according to a conventional semiotic order. It emerges as an 
actual and sudden event not belonging to meaningful semiotic conventions.
Considering these two signs, it can be argued that the reproduced and represent-
ed subjectivity in the discourse (subject of statement) is a replica of the desired sub-
jectivity produced by a logonomic system. Th e legisign-subjectivity by reproducing 
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itself in diff erent contexts creates many replicas, namely its contextualized versions. 
Also it seems that the repressed subjectivity as something excluded from the dis-
course and conventional types of subjectivity is the mere sinsign of subjectivity not 
preceded by any conventional form. Th us, it is unique and unconventional. It emerg-
es through a symptomatic rhetoric employed to escape censorship imposed by the 
logonomic system. In other words, it expresses itself via an alienated discourse (from 
its own repressed reality) to be consistent with the logonomic order. As mentioned 
above, the symptom relates the logonomic system to the repressed entity via rhetori-
cal transformations. In the same manner, the symptom as a linkage brings two con-
tradictory subjectivities together. Consequently, by drawing on the rhetorical trans-
formation the repressed subjectivity links itself to the realm of conventional forms 
of subjectivities. By disguising itself as the formal clichés of subjectivity, it may be 
allowed to participate in the communicative discourse in a converted way. It seems 
that the symptom is like a hinge around which contradictory poles including the law 
and the repressed, the subject of statement and the subject of speaking turn. Th is ca-
pability of the symptom refers to its rhetorical procedures, including metaphor, me-
tonymy, projection, transference, etc.
5. Little Hans and his stubborn castrators
In this section, I am going to discuss a Freudian case, namely, Little Hans (see, Freud 
2000a: 157–276), according to the antagonistic aspects of symptom. Little Hans is 
one of the cases analysed by Freud indirectly. By reporting the daily life of Hans to 
Freud, Hans’ father exercised psychoanalytic procedures on Hans on behalf of Freud. 
Union of the institutions of family and psychoanalysis against the infantile semiotic 
world is evident in this case. Th e emergence of the unconventional semiotic world of 
Hans faces the aggressive reactions of Freud and Hans’ father at the prompting of the 
dominant logonomic system. Hans’ symptoms try to make a compromise between 
these two confl icting worlds: the infantile world of Hans and the paternal world of 
Freud and Hans’ father. Th ey include a synthetic rhetorical construction to forge a 
compromise between the infantile and the paternal discourses.
At the beginning of the narration, Hans is continuously asking questions about 
the sexual organs of his parents, himself, and others. He also masturbates, and can-
not curb his curiosity about sexual matters. He is accused of desires for patricide 
and incest, and is represented as a little Oedipus (see Freud 200a: 236). His mother 
threatens him with castration, and blames him for his hideous questions. His father 
wants to convince him that his ideas about sexual matters are abnormal and patho-
logical. In order to analyse the case, Freud continuously refers to his transcendental 
principles including the Oedipus complex, desires for patricide and incest. It seems 
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that aft er the process of Freudian treatment, Hans is cured by accepting the castra-
tion complex. In the fi nal parts of the narration, Hans pretends to surrender himself 
to the logonomic system of his father and Freud. 
Th e focal problem in this case is the symptomatic phobia of Hans according 
to which Hans fears going out because he thinks that a horse may bite him. Freud 
(2000a: 261) believes that Hans’ phobia makes a compromise between his desire to 
remain at home with his mother and his fear of being punished by his father. Th e 
hybrid nature of the phobia is evident here. Firstly, it is for escaping from being pun-
ished by the father as the paternal representative of the logonomic system, and sec-
ondly, it is there to satisfy his desire for his mother indirectly through his justifi ed 
remaining with the mother. Th is phobia makes a compromise between both of his 
fear of the father and his love for the mother.
 Th e other symptomatic phenomena in this case have the same function of forg-
ing a compromise between the contradictory poles. As an example, let us consider 
the symptomatic fi gure of the horse. In the early parts of the narration, the fi gure 
seems to be a substitute for the mother, but as the narration continues, it acquires 
some new visual properties which lead Freud to think that the horse can be a sub-
stitute for the father. In the fi rst parts of the story, Freud and Hans’ father are con-
vinced that it is a substitute for the mother (Freud 2000a: 218), and in the fi nal parts, 
they conclude that it may be a substitute for the father (Freud 2000a: 258). Th is is be-
cause Hans fi rstly describes the horse in relation to the repressed object, namely his 
mother, but fi nally he speaks about something black around the muzzle of the horse 
which is like a moustache. Accordingly, the horse has a polysemous character that 
can simultaneously represent the repressed object of desire (mother) and the pater-
nal fi gure of the logonomic system. It seems that the horse as a prototypical case of 
symptom involves two contradictory parts including the seductive maternal object 
and the paternal fi gure of law. 
But the question is between which discourses do the symptomatic phenomena 
make a compromise? It seems that the symptoms create a compromise and linkage 
between the infantile discourse of Little Hans (the unconventional and repressed 
discourse) and the dominant discourse of Hans’ father and Freud. It can be argued 
that Hans as a subject is marked by a specifi c discourse which challenges the logo-
nomic system. Freud does not speak about the infantile discourse of Hans, and con-
tinuously refers to Oedipal clichés to explain the function of the symptoms, but I am 
going to show that Little Hans has a specifi c unconventional semiotic discourse that 
faces an aggressive reaction from Freud and Hans’ father, and the symptoms try to 
make a linkage between the confl icting discourses. I leave aside the Freudian clichés, 
and try to present the infantile discourse of Hans.
It seems that the unconventional discourse of Hans cannot be reduced to Freu-
dian principles. Th is discourse arises as a result of a specifi c categorization. Hans’ 
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discourse categorizes entities according to two distinctive features including {having 
or not having genitals} and {the size (long and short) of genitals}. Th e unconven-
tional categorization shapes the infantile discourse of Hans which Freud and Hans’ 
father try to remove. According to this kind of categorization, humans and animals 
(like the horse and the giraff e) belong to the category of having genitals, and chairs 
and desks belong to the category of not having genitals. It should be noted that Hans 
sometimes faces some borderline cases. For example, when he sees a machine from 
which water is dropping, he enquires where the genital organ of this machine is (see 
Freud 2000a: 160). Also, he sub-categorizes entities according to the size of their 
sexual organs; accordingly, the mother, father, horses, and giraff es are categorized 
as having long genitals, but Hans’ little sister, and her doll belong to the subcatego-
ry of having short genitals (see Freud 2000a: 164). It is worth mentioning that the 
male and female distinction is not important in Hans’ categorization. Th e pseudo-
homosexual behaviours of Hans should be interpreted in the light of this specifi c 
categorization. Accordingly, all the animate beings having genitals can be possible 
sexual partners. It can be argued that Hans is not a homosexual, but is a kind of pan-
sexual. Th e other important point in his discourse is that Hans considers females as 
having bodies with genitals and not as imperfect bodies envying the male genitals. 
But Hans’ father and Freud continuously try to convince him that women are lack-
ing genitals, and represent them as incomplete bodies (see Freud 2000a: 176). Not 
only do Hans’ father and Freud represent women as castrated humans, but they also 
threaten Hans by their castrating ideology. Th ey insistently try to separate entities 
and humans according to their sexual and epistemological ideology. One of Hans’ 
fantasy shows the violent separation brought about by the ideology of Freud and 
Hans’ father clearly: 
In the night there was a big giraff e in the room and a crumpled one; and the big 
one called out because I took the crumpled one away from it. Th en it stopped 
calling out; and then I sat on top of the crumpled one. (Freud 2000a: 183)
As always, Freud says that this story refers to a scene of copulation seen by Hans. Th e 
important point in the scene is not copulation, but the painful separation of the big 
giraff e from the little crumpled one. Th e giraff es let out a cry expressing their strong 
emotions about the separation. Th e ideology of separation and castration has been 
manifested in this infantile fantasy. But who are the big giraff e and the little crum-
pled one? It can be argued that the big giraff e is the mother (like the big horse in the 
fi rst parts of the narration) and the little crumpled one is Little Hans. When Little 
Hans sits on the little crumpled giraff e, he wants to indicate that the two signs are in 
a paradigmatic relation. In other words, in this case they can be substituted, conse-
quently, they are the same. Th en, this narration may be a symbolic representation of 
 Symptom without transcendental syntax 43
separating Hans from his mother and his infantile world, and in the same manner 
separating Hans and women from their genitals and bodies. It seems that this fan-
tasy represents the castrating ideology of Freud and Hans’ father. Th is ideology tries 
to separate the entities and illegal combinations according to its sexual logonomic 
system. Also, it tries to castrate women and children, and represents women as in-
complete bodies whose genitals have been removed. Th ey continuously threaten to 
remove the genitals of Hans, and to separate him from his mother and friends. Freud 
and Hans’ father consider Hans’ discourse as abnormal and pathological, and try to 
regulate it in order to assimilate Hans’ discourse into the conventional order. 
Th e subjectivity brought about by Hans’ unconventional discourse is in contrast 
with the desired subjectivity of the familial ideology. Hans’ infantile subjectivity is 
the output of his underlying unconventional categorization. His sexual personality 
and his ontological divisions of the world do not correspond to the ontological or-
der of the dominant logonomic system. His conceptions of women, familial relation-
ships, and his pansexual tendency may not be tolerated by the patriarchal ideology 
of his father and Freud. Accordingly, his infantile subjectivity is not the reproduced 
subjectivity of the clichéd and ideological subjectivity (legisign). Th is abnormal and 
unique subjectivity seems to be a pure sinsign not preceded by any legisign. Th e fa-
milial ideology of subjectivity and sexuality as incarnated in Freud and Hans’ father 
persistently seeks to regulate Hans’ abnormal subjectivity. Hans’ symptomatic behav-
iours try to create a compromise between two subjectivities belonging to confl icting 
discourses, namely the infantile discourse of Hans and the dominant familial dis-
course. As Freud puts it, the phobia provides such a compromise (Freud 2000a: 269). 
Th e phobia as a symptomatic behaviour helps Hans to manage the contradiction be-
tween the incompatible discourses. Th e phobia shows the contradictory relation of 
Hans to his own discourse and the dominant familial discourse. In the same manner, 
the symptomatic fi gure of the horse represents this ambivalent attitude. In the fi rst 
parts, the image represents the seductive fi gure of the mother, and then represents 
the aggressive and dangerous paternal fi gure of law. Th e horse is the most prototypi-
cal case of the symptom.
Now let us review Hans’ last fantasy: “Th e plumber came; and fi rst he took away 
my behind with a pair of pincers, and then gave me another, and then the same with 
my widdler” (Freud 2000a: 237). Freud interprets this story as an indicator of an 
acquired castration complex. As a result, by telling this story, Hans wants to show 
that he has left  his unconventional sexual discourse, and has accepted the familial 
logonomic system of sexuality and subjectivity. Th e fi rst genitals (anus and phal-
lus) taken away by the plumber belong to the infantile sexual discourse of Hans, and 
the second ones given to him by the plumber belong to the dominant sexual dis-
course. Freud interprets this narration as the sign of the success of psychoanalysis in 
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regulating Hans’ abnormal discourse. But in spite of Freud’s optimism, it should be 
noted that we can regard this fantasy as another misinterpreted symptom. It seems 
that this story as a symptom is meant to deceive Hans’ father and Freud as represen-
tatives of the dominant logonomic system. In one of his psychoanalytical analyses, 
Freud (2000b: 294–5) refers to the lie of the dream. In this case, he analyses a lesbian 
girl who is under pressure to leave her abnormal tendencies. She suddenly starts to 
dream about marriage and having a child. Accordingly, Freud thinks that she has 
acquired heterosexual tendencies. Yet he recognizes that her dreams resemble lies 
told to deceive her family and psychoanalyst in order to get rid of their stubborn 
interpellations. Consequently, the very symptomatic nature of the dream transforms 
it into a message antagonistic toward the psychoanalyst’s logonomic system. Th e 
dream should not be considered as a container that includes some truth about the 
patient; it may, however, be an anti-language which is wisely decorated in order to 
deceive the psychoanalyst. In a similar manner, it seems that the last Hans’s fantasy is 
a symptomatic message for deceiving the representatives of the dominant logonomic 
system (Freud and father) to get rid of their insistent interpellation.
6. Conclusion
Th is paper tried to explain the symptom as conditioned by the socio-ideological 
context from a social semiotic perspective. Th e symptom as a converted sign is re-
lated to its repressed object via rhetorical transformations, namely metaphor and 
metonymy. It expresses its meaning in a fi gurative way to escape the censorship from 
the logonomic system. Th e symptom, the repressed phenomenon, and the logonom-
ic system do not have atemporal and universal contents, but they are determined by 
discursive antagonism in a certain socio-historical context. Th e symptom as an anti-
language challenges the semiotic order of the dominant discourse, but it should be 
noted that its approach to the logonomic system is hypocritical, because on the one 
hand, it is related to a hideous and unethical object, and on the other hand, it adapts 
its rhetoric to the logonomic system. Th is ambivalent aspect of the symptom makes 
it a specifi c anti-language. Th e symptom is a paradoxical phenomenon in which the 
contradictory poles approach each other in a discordant discourse. Th us, it is where 
the subject of speaking links itself to the subject of statement. Th is relationship is 
made possible via rhetorical transformations. Th e dialectical relationship of the 
symptom to the law and the repressed object can bring about its interpretation. Th is 
interpretation is done without any transcendental principles and universal essential-
ism. Accordingly, the symbolic antagonism of the symptom towards the logonomic 
system may be explained immanently. In other words, no transcendental syntax is 
needed to interpret the symptom.
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Симптом без трансцендентального синтаксиса
Цель статьи – изучение симптома Фрейда как индивидуального антиязыка, который 
вовлечен в семиотический антагонизм посредством внутренней логономической си-
стемы. В психоанализе фрейдистско-лакановского толка симптом трактуется исходя 
из трансцендентальных и атепморальных принципов. Мы предлагаем социосемиоти-
ческий подход, где значение симптома определяется его антагонистическим отноше-
нием к логономической системе, а также связью симптома с репрессируемым объек-
том в определенном социокультурном контексте. Двойственный семиозис симптома 
указывает на риторические трансформации, проводимые для достижения компромис-
са между противоречивыми полюсами закона и подавленного энтитета. Что касается 
соотношения симптома с субъективностью, то симптом проявляется как соединение, 
где субъект аргумента находится в конфликте с субъектом речи. Таким образом, пер-
вый как реплика субъективности общего знака (legisign-subjectivity) симптоматично 
связан со вторым как простым единичным знаком (sinsign), которому не предшеству-
ет никакая идеологическая субъективность. Симптом – это как дверная петля, на ко-
торой двигаются противоположные двери (сознательное и бессознательное). В конце 
статьи анализируется случай Маленького Ганса как пример антагонистических аспек-
тов симптома.
Sümptom transtsendentaalse süntaksita
Artikli eesmärgiks on uurida Freudi sümptomit kui individuaalset antikeelt, mis on kaasa-
tud semiootilisse antagonismi sisemise logonoomilise süsteemiga. Freudistlik-lakaniaanlikus 
psühhoanalüüsis tõlgendatakse sümptomit teatud transtsendentaalsetest ja atemporaalsetest 
põhimõtetest lähtuvalt. Neid põhimõtteid kõrvale jättes pakume välja sotsiosemiootilise lä-
henemise, milles sümptomi tähenduse määrab ära selle antagonistlik suhe logonoomilise 
süsteemiga ja ka selle konverteeritud seos allasurutud objektiga kindlas sotsiokultuurilises 
kontekstis. Sümptomaatilist antagonismi tähistab selle silmakirjalik ning ambivalentne suhe 
logonoomilise süsteemi ning allasurutud entiteediga. Sümptomi kahetine semioos osutab re-
toorilistele transformatsioonidele, mida tehakse, saavutamaks kompromissi seaduse ning kee-
latud nähtuse vasturääkivate pooluste vahel. Mis puutub sümptomi suhtesse subjektiivsusega, 
tõuseb sümptom esile liitolukorrana, milles väite subjekt on kõnelemise subjektiga konfl iktses 
suhtes. Seega on esimene kui seadusmärgi subjektiivsuse (legisign-subjectivity) koopia sümp-
tomaatiliselt seotud teise kui lihtsa ainumärgiga (sinsign), millele ei eelne mingit ideoloogi-
list subjektiivsust. Sümptom on nagu uksehing, millel liiguvad vastassuunalised uksed, nimelt 
teadvus ja mitteteadvus. Lõpuks analüüsitakse Väikese Hansu juhtumit sümptomi antagonist-
likest aspektidest lähtuvalt.
